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In this important book, the outcome of several decades of intense 
philosophical activity, Evandro Agazzi offers rigorous argumentation in 
favour of an original conception of scientific realism and objectivity in 
science.
The book begins with an analysis of the origin of what the author calls 
“dualism”—both in its ontological and epistemological versions—in 
which he correctly locates the source of contemporary relativist and 
antirealist views on science (29). Ontological dualism goes back to the 
ancient Greeks and divides the world into “surface appearances” and 
“deep authentic realities”. In its epistemological version, dualism 
appears with the birth of modern science in the seventeenth century. 
Epistemological dualism postulates a dichotomy between our ideas or 
mental representations, which are supposedly immediately known to us, 
and reality itself. Such a division raises the question of the faithfulness 
of our representations to the realities which they are meant to represent 
(245). But this problem has no satisfactory solution. Once a wedge is 
driven between ideas and things, we are inevitably drawn to a sceptical 
attitude with respect to science’s capacity to reach knowledge of reality.
1,*
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By embracing a realist position, Agazzi stands against dualism: science 
aims at knowing what is real, including some unobservable entities, and 
manages to do so, albeit only partially.
Agazzi distinguishes the proposition, which is the sense of a sentence, 
and the statement, which is an assertion (4.4.2). Strictly speaking, only 
a statement can be true or false. It is true when the state of affairs, the 
existence of which is asserted, actually obtains and false when it does 
not, according to a correspondence—or better, referential—theory of 
truth. Truth and falsity are therefore properties of statements. Meaning
always includes two components: sense and reference (81). For a 
statement, its sense is its associated proposition and its reference is a 
possible state of affairs, the existence of which makes the proposition 
true.
We certainly speak about something, this something 
consists of substances endowed with attributes, and these 
attributes result from the encounter between our way of 
investigating reality and what reality is. (231)
For Agazzi, there is no reason to doubt the existence of things
immediately present in sensory perception. But to verify that some 
things actually possess the properties we are interested in, we perform 
some actions. In order to know the number of pencils in a box, we take 
them out to count them. These operations aim at determining whether 
the targeted things possess some specific properties, and thus whether 
some statements about them are true. In doing so, we “clip out” in 
things some objects (89), which are “structured sets of 
properties” (284). Only some of the properties of a thing play a role in 
the construction of a concrete object.
A concrete object, as opposed to an abstract object which is an 
intentional object of thought, has properties rooted in a real thing. An 
abstract object is a noema (in Husserl’s sense) which encodes
properties, to use Zalta’s ( 1988 ) terminology. When the encoded 
properties belong to a real thing, the abstract object is exemplified, and 
we have a concrete object, according to Agazzi. The existence of the 
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thing guarantees that the word which designates the concrete object has 
a referent since the properties of the concrete object are also properties 
of the existing thing that exemplifies the abstract object.(Contrary to 
Agazzi,  Zalta’s abstract objects are not exemplified by concrete 
objects. Abstract objects are individuals which both encode and 
exemplify properties. When a concrete object exemplifies all the 
properties encoded by the abstract object, it is a physical “correlate” of 
the abstract object. I’m grateful to Ed Zalta for having clarified this 
point.)
Scientific objects exist as abstract objects (i.e. as 
intellectual constructions) that encode certain properties, 
while not being purely abstract since they are 
exemplified (within certain margins of accuracy) by 
concretely existing objects. (Agazzi,104, n. 48)
Operations play a central role in objectivity. There are different types, 
and Agazzi does not provide a definition of an operation in general. 
However, he distinguishes between operations on perceived things and 
operations on the unobservable entities postulated in science. At the 
perceptive level, one can ask a human subject to pick up a red pencil in 
a set of pencils of various colours (76–78). If different subjects agree, 
we get weak objectivity, in the sense of intersubjective agreement. But a 
realist argues that we sometimes have good reasons to believe in the 
existence of a real thing which exemplifies some properties. In such 
cases, we reach strong objectivity, in the referential sense.
Does Agazzi fall back into the aporia of idealistic dualism because it 
seems that we have to determine whether the object thought, 
immediately present to the mind, corresponds or not to a real object? 
No, not at all. An operation does not consist in comparing a 
representation, which would be the noema, with a concrete object, but 
in operating on real things according to some point of view in order to 
check whether the properties encoded by an abstract object are 
instantiated. In performing an operation, we are directly in contact with 
reality and its outcome allows us (or not) to ascertain the truth of an 
assertion, albeit not without eliminating any risk of error (285). Let me 
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point out, however, that the justificationist power of operations relies on 
perceptual presence. Indeed, I see that other subjects grasp the red 
pencil when asked to. I am then entitled to assert that they see 
something which they call “red”, even though it makes no sense to ask 
whether they are presented with the same red. Even if I am the only one 
to act, there is no way to eliminate my perception from the outcome of 
an operation.
Every scientific discipline neglects some properties in things. This 
process characterises the abstractive demarche. Here, we must 
distinguish between the things we can directly observe, such as certain 
luminous points, called “planets”, moving relatively to other luminous 
points which are apparently immobile, called “stars”, and entities such 
as electrons and viruses whose properties are epistemically accessible 
by means of measuring instruments only.
For observable things, the question of the reference of the word 
“planet” does not raise any major difficulty. The intersubjective 
agreement in multiple conditions of observations permits us to 
unambiguously identify the real referent of the term “planet”. Next, we 
must select some properties and measure them. The structured sets of 
properties determine the objects which belong to a discipline such as 
astronomy. These properties are denoted by “basic predicates” (89). In 
classical mechanics, the predicates “mass”, “length” and “duration” are 
basic predicates to which “protocol criteria” are associated. In the 
context of a discipline, these criteria allow us to decide which 
statements are immediately true: the protocol assertions which only 
contain basic predicates. The protocol criteria are the criteria of 
objectivity relative to a scientific discipline (89).
We may call criteria of protocollarity those specific 
criteria which, within a certain science, permit the 
determination of which propositions are immediately 
true. (87)
An object of a certain science is simply an aspect of 
reality capable of being described by propositions that 
can be directly or indirectly assigned a truth-value by 
1
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means of the criteria of protocollarity of that science. 
(89)
These protocol criteria are connected to measuring operations which 
allow us to affirm if a given thing possesses a given mass, for example. 
A measuring operation is in general indirect but is, for Agazzi, 
immediate since the scientist who knows how to interpret the data can 
without delay attribute a property, such as a mass value, to a concrete 
object.
When the things to which our statements refer are perceptible, as 
planets are, Agazzi’s argumentation is solid. But, when we deal with 
unobservable entities, our access to their supposed properties is only 
indirect by means of measuring operations. An unobservable entity is 
first an object described by a theory in which it is reduced to a thought 
object: a mere concept. It is a set of thought properties which determine 
the intensional component of meaning, that is, the sense of the term. 
The other component is the reference.
We define the term “electron” through a structured set of 
mathematically formulated properties which together 
constitute a certain abstract object. But this does not 
entail that these are meant to be properties of the abstract 
object; they are meant to be properties of the single 
electrons which are the intended referents of the 
mathematical model we have constructed. (113)
For Agazzi, a scientific realist must argue in favour of two main claims:
(a) science attempts to represent a reality independent of 
science itself, and is committed to measuring itself on 
the basis of its success or failure in doing so; (b) what 
science states is an adequate representation of this reality 
‘as it is’. (263)
What are the reasons to believe in the existence of objects such as 
electrons, which possess precise properties of mass, charge and spin? 
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Agazzi is opposed to radical empiricist views, such as van Fraassen’s, 
according to which scientific knowledge remains limited to observable 
objects and their sensible properties. Surely, for Agazzi, the 
justification of our beliefs in the existence of unobservable entities 
partly rests on our explanatory reasoning. Yet, he does not offer a 
general theory of explanation, probably because explanation takes 
various forms in different disciplines. At some places, Agazzi seems to 
implicitly subscribe to the classical argument in favour of scientific 
realism, namely inference to the best explanation, especially in its 
causal version: we have good reasons to believe in electrons because 
their existence is the only reasonable explanation of the occurrence of 
some observable and measurable effects predicted by the theory (5.5.3).
We all know that inference to the best explanation (IBE)—which the 
“no-miracles argument” relies on—has been criticised by both 
antirealists and some realists, including myself (see Ghins 2002 ). But 
Agazzi formulates this argument in an original and also more 
convincing way on the basis of his central notion of operation. If being 
guided by the scientific descriptions of unobservable objects we can 
operate on them or manipulate them to attain certain objectives, then we 
have a powerful argument in favour of their existence.
If we succeed in operating on reality, letting ourselves 
be guided by a science, it follows that this science has 
picked out some actual properties of reality. (285)
Moreover, the impressive success of technology forcefully adds to the 
plausibility of a realist position.
The whole world of technology (…) [is] a gigantic and 
irrefutable confirmation of the truth of our scientific 
theories and of the realist purport of science. (309)
Yet, Agazzi is aware that successful operations are not enough to prove 
the existence of some concrete objects. Before Lavoisier, chemists 
successfully operated on what they called “phlogiston”. Larry Laudan 
warned us against excessive credulity with respect to the existence of 
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unobservable objects which seem to play a causal role in the production 
of some observed effects. Agazzi replies by advocating the selective 
strategy, called the divide et impera strategy by Stathis Psillos, which 
requires that only properties that fulfil an explanatory and predictive 
role can be attributed to concrete objects.
Only when the postulated referents are characterised 
through properties which actually play a logical (…) role 
in explanation and, especially, in prediction, can they be 
credited with a solid ontological status. (302)
What is this “solid ontological status” conferred to certain objects? For 
Agazzi, only operational praxis allows us to know concrete objects, that 
is, referents which “reach out” of the context of language and theory. 
Our operations provide “specific criteria for establishing reference and, 
therefore, for fixing the stable core of the operational concepts” (133). 
The intension or meaning of an operational concept certainly depends 
on theoretical context, but also, crucially, on reference.
The stable core, or ground intension, of an operational 
concept is ‘stable’ because it expresses a relation of the 
concept to something which is external to the theory. 
(127)
It becomes possible to weight the respective merits of competing 
theories when their basic operational concepts have the same ground 
meaning. Since such theories imply statements containing only common 
operational concepts, empirical data can lead us to decide in favour of 
one of the theories (135).
On the other hand, when the referents of basic operational concepts are 
different, the empirical merits of distinct theories cannot be compared, 
even if the same terms are associated with these concepts. For example, 
one cannot compare quantum mechanics to classical mechanics. Why? 
Because their basic operational concepts are different: these theories 
deal with different objects.
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The operational criteria for testing statements are 
different in the two domains (e.g. in microphysics one 
would never measure lengths by using a metre stick, or 
masses by using scales). (116)
Such a view entails that classical mechanics has not been falsified by 
quantum mechanics (116). These theories can peacefully coexist 
because they adopt different standpoints on things (137). Their 
respective concrete objects both exist.
Material points exist no less than electrons in the sense 
that the criteria of referentiality needed for finding them 
are essentially not different from those needed for 
electrons. (104)
These criteria are analogous to those which convince us of the existence 
of a table:
We can touch the table, move it, sit on it, considering all 
these features not so much as ways of perceiving, but as 
ways of acting, or of meeting a resistance. (183)
For Agazzi, theories are not strictly speaking true or false, but they 
express a way of seeing, a Gestalt on reality (293). On the other hand, 
theories can be more or less adequate, always according to some 
perspective adopted on reality.
A particular theory which turns out not to be adequate 
from several points of view (…) remains partially
adequate from certain points of view; and this is enough 
to afford an understanding of its predictive success. This 
success depends on those parts of the theory which are 
adequate. (301)
Yet Agazzi claims that theories also contain assertions which can be 
taken to be true from the theory’s point of view on reality. For this 
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reason, some assertions on material points can be considered to be true 
in the context of a theory of planetary motions and false in the context 
of a mechanical theory of rigid bodies. Indeed, scientific objectivity is 
contextual as the title of the book makes clear.
Agazzi defends a cumulative, but not necessarily linear, vision of 
scientific progress. If successive theories in a scientific discipline share 
operational criteria and a domain of referents, we can speak of 
cumulative and linear progress. Successive theories increase our 
knowledge about some concrete objects. However, when a new 
discipline such as quantum mechanics appears, progress ceases to be 
linear since our knowledge is enlarged to the new domain of 
microphysical objects.
Agazzi’s way of considering scientific progress is problematic when 
successive theories attribute contradictory properties to the same things. 
Agazzi admits that certain scientific objects such as atoms become 
things when their existence can no longer be questioned. Atoms belong 
to the background knowledge presupposed by the community of 
scientists (183). But quantum mechanics attributes to atoms properties, 
such as entanglement, which are incompatible with the properties of 
classical mechanics. Agazzi would reply that these two theories clip out 
of things different properties in order to construct distinct objects. Yet, 
if the concrete objects are abstract objects exemplified in things and if 
things are supposed to possess the properties of the concrete objects, 
some things, such as atoms, are endowed with contradictory properties. 
To solve this aporia, Agazzi proposes a version of contextualism which 
distances him from realism.
Do we really believe that Ptolemaic astronomy is still 
true, that the corpuscular theory of light was not 
disproved (…), that Newtonian mechanics was not 
disproved by relativistic and quantum mechanics, and so 
on? Our answer is that these theories have been 
disproved to the extent that they are believed to speak 
about ‘things’; but they are still true if they are correctly 
judged on the basis of what they say about their 
‘objects’. (404)
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This conclusion is unavoidable if changes in operational criteria of a 
theory necessarily entail that we get a new theory which speaks of new 
objects. By this move, Agazzi pretends to preserve a realist conception 
of cumulative progress which consists in the succession of theories 
which increase our knowledge of some objects or enlarge it to new 
ones.
However, as Mario Alai remarks, it is hard to maintain that the 
corpuscular, undulatory and quantum theories of light are all partially 
true given that some properties of their respective objects are 
contradictory ( 2015 , 62). If the objects relative to a theory are abstract 
only, there is no problem. But Agazzi claims that the properties encoded 
by some theoretical objects are also instantiated by concrete objects and 
thus instantiated by real things. And a thing cannot possess 
contradictory attributes, unless the meaning of an attribute is reduced to 
its measuring operations. Agazzi, however, rejects such Bridgmanian 
operationalism (94).
The only way out for the realist is to develop a theory of the stability of 
reference through the evolution of theories which does not depend on 
operational procedures of measurement (Ghins 2013 ). Granted, we hit 
on external things such as electrons through operations. But the 
properties we attribute to them can be abandoned, modified or 
completed as science moves on. To progress is to know more about the 
properties and behaviour of things such as electrons. Today we have 
good reasons to believe in the existence of concrete objects which have 
precise values of mass, charge, spin, etc., even if those properties do not 
exhaust the properties of electrons and even if we might err.
Be that as it may, the conception of objectivity defended by Agazzi 
certainly is a major contribution to the current debate on scientific 
realism. Moreover, within his realist position, Agazzi also offers new 
insights on numerous other important philosophical issues: the relation 
between science and society, science and metaphysics, etc. The scope, 
erudition, rigour and originality of Agazzi’s book make it essential 
reading for all philosophers of science. 
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